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STUDENT COMMENT
I.R.S.

AND THE FOREIGN TAX CREDIT: THE
RESTRICTIVE VIEW OF REVENUE RULING 78-61.

THE

JAMES
I.

J. DUFFICY*

INTRODUCTION

In 1978 the Internal Revenue Service issued two rulings'
that clarify its position with respect to the creditability of
foreign income, war profits, or excess profits taxes.' This comment will examine the position taken by the I.R.S. in one of
those rulings.'
In Rev. Rul. 78-61, the Ontario Mining tax was held to be
neither an income tax nor a tax in lieu of an income tax within
the meaning of sections 901 and 903 of the Internal Revenue
Code, and the credit for the tax was denied.'
* B.A., 1977, University of Denver; J.D. candidate, 1980 University of Denver.
1. Rev. Rul. 78-61, I.R. Bull. No. 1978-8 11; Rev. Rul. 78-62, I.R. Bull. No. 19788 16.
2. The foreign tax credit provision is contained in I.R.C. § 901. Pertinent provisions include:
(a) Allowance of Credit - If the taxpayer chooses to have the benefits of this subpart, the tax imposed by this chapter shall, subject to the
applicable limitation of section 904, be credited with the amounts provided in the applicable paragraph of subsection (b)...
(b) Amount Allowed - Subject to the limitation of section 904, the
following amounts shall be allowed as the credit under subsection (a):
(1) Citizens and domestic corporations - In the case of a citizen of
the United States and of a domestic corporation, the amount of any
income, war profits, and excess profits taxes paid or accrued during the
taxable year to any foreign country or to any possession of the United
States; ....
3. While dealing directly only with Rev. Rul. 78-61, this comment will, in effect,
deal also with Rev. Rul. 78-62, since the latter revolves around the same principles of
creditability as the former.
4. I.R.C. § 903 grants an alternative credit for any taxes paid to a foreign country
in lieu of an income tax. Under Tress. Reg. 1.903-1(a)(3), 1957-2 C.B. 419, the credit
can be claimed only: (a) if the country has in force a general income tax law; (b) if
the taxpayer would be subject to the tax in the absence of a specific exemption; and
(c) if the income tax is not imposed upon the taxpayer subject to the substitute tax.
In the instance case the I.R.S., after denying the § 901 credit, also properly denied
a credit under § 903 because the taxpayer in question was also subject to a general
income tax from which he had not been exempted by the operation of the mining tax.
This part of the decision will not be considered further, as it was amply justified in
light of relevant case authority. On the creditability of "in lieu of" taxes, see generally
Northwestern Mut. Fire Ass'n v. Commissioner, 181 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1950); Abbot
Laboratories Int'l Co. v. United States, 160 F. Supp. 321 (N.D. Ill. 1958), aff'd per
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The tax was levied on all profit of any mine in the Canadian province of Ontario if the profit from the mining function
exceeded $50,000 for the taxable year. "Profit" under the act
was defined as the sum of the gross receipts from the sale of
ore, plus the actual market value of unsold ore that had been
extracted during the year, less a narrow group of deductions.
The I.R.S. disallowed the credit under these circumstances. The mining tax was held to be levied not on income actually received from extracting and selling the ore, but on the
value of the extraction. The tax was due on the value of the
output whether or not it was sold (and in the case of output
that had been incorporated into the owner's manufacturing
process, in spite of the fact that it never would be sold). Furthermore, the Ontario tax did not allow the deduction of significant operating expenses that are deductible under the Internal
Revenue Code of the United States. Some of the more important nondeductible expenses were interest, initial exploration
and development expenses, taxes and royalties paid, depletion
allowances, salaries and other expenses not directly connected
to the mining function (in a typical mining enterprise, there are
also manufacturing and treatment functions). Since this tax
was levied on the market value of the extracted ore and not on
an actual income base, the I.R.S. classified it as "a production
or severance tax on the mining privilege," a noncreditable tax.5
II.

BACKGROUND

The United States Government taxes its nationals on
their worldwide income. This method of taxation could lead
to double taxation, i.e., paying income taxes on the same income to the United States and to the country where the income
curiam, 267 F.2d 940 (7th Cir. 1959); Compania Embotelladora Coca-Cola v. United
States, 139 F. Supp. 953 (Ct. Cl. 1956); F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.
1233 (1970), nonacq. on another issue, 1971-2 C.B. 4.
5. The I.R.S. also properly ruled that this tax should be considered in its entirety,
as it is an indivisible tax. As a general rule, when a tax is imposed upon more than
one base, one of which would qualify as a proper base for the credit and one or more
of which would not, that part of the tax levied upon a qualifying base will be creditable
provided it is computed separately from the tax that is imposed upon a nonqualifying
base. In the instant case, all of the various bases (output sold, output incorporated in
a manufacturing process, and output sold after treatment) were combined, the allowable deductions were expensed against the entire base, and the tax was then computed
upon the single base. Cf. Lanman & Kemp-Barclay & Co. of Columbia v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. (1956); Rev. Rul. 74-435, 1974-2 C.B. 204.

1979

THE FOREIGN TAX CREDIT

has been earned.' To prevent double taxation, Congress
granted a tax credit.7 Generally, section 901 allows a credit (a
dollar-for-dollar reduction from overall tax liability)' for any
income, war profits, or excess profits taxes paid to a foreign
country.' The major source of contention within section 901
has been over the meaning of the words "income tax"; that is,
when is a particular foreign tax an income tax within the meaning of section 901?
For nearly twenty years after the original enactment of the
foreign tax credit provision in 1918, the Supreme Court allowed
the foreign characterization of the tax as an income tax to
control creditability.'0 However, with the landmark case of
Biddle v. Commissioner," the courts now refuse to allow a foreign characterization of a tax to control. Since Biddle, the
courts have consistently applied the American conception of
"income tax": I" the foreign tax must be the substantial equiva6. For a general discussion of the problems of double taxation, see generally H.R.
REP. No. 94-658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), 1976-3 C.B. 695, 904; Characterization
of an Income Tax for the Purpose of the Foreign Tax Credit, 14 VAND. L. REv. 1469
(1961).
7. "The primary objective . . . [of § 901] is to prevent double taxation and a
secondary objective is to encourage American foreign trade." American Metal Co. v.
Commissioner, 221 F.2d 134, 137 (2d Cir. 1955).
8. I.R.C. § 164(a) allows a deduction of such taxes even if the credit is denied.
This is generally less favorable to the taxpayer because the deduction merely reduces
the tax base upon which U.S. income tax is levied, while a credit directly reduces the
amount of the tax liability by the amount of the credit.
9. Taxes which are paid to a political subdivision of a foreign country are also
creditable if they qualify. See Burnet v. Chicago Portrait Co., 285 U.S. 1 (1931);
Havana Electric Railway, Light & Power Co. v. Commissioner, 34 B.T.A. 782 (1936)
(an income tax imposed by the municipality of Havana was creditable under § 901).
10. Eitington Schild Co. & Subsidiaries v. Commissioner, 21 B.T.A. 1163 (1931)
(a turnover tax imposed upon all business activity in France was not a qualifying
income tax for purposes of the foreign tax credit, largely because France had imposed
this tax apart from its income tax).
11. 302 U.S. 573 (1938).
12. See New York & Honduras Rosario Mining Co. v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 745
(2d Cir. 1948) (Houduran tax imposed upon liquid profits derived from the mining
enterprise was credited because of its similarity to the United States income tax);
Keasbey & Mattison Co. v. Rothensies, 133 F.2d 894 (3rd Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320
U.S. 739 (1943) (Quebec mining tax was noncreditable because the tax base, the value
of ore extracted, did not constitute an income base in the United States sense); accord,
Motland v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 358 (N.D. Iowa 1961); St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 44 F. Supp. 863 (D. Minn. 1942); Bank of America Nat'l Trust
& Say. Ass'n v. United States, 459 F.2d 513 (Ct. Cl. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 949
(1972); F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1233 (1970), nonacq. on another
issue, 1971-2, C.B. 4; Lanman & Kemp-Barclay & Co. of Colombia v. Commissioner,
26 T.C. 582 (1956).
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lent of an income tax as defined by United States law. 3 The
scant legislative history on the issue of creditability gives implicit approval to this test."
To determine whether a particular tax is the substantial
equivalent of the United States income tax, the courts look
primarily to the tax base. To qualify for a credit, the foreign
tax must be levied on a base that corresponds closely to income
as understood in the United States. This conclusion indicates
that the tax must be imposed on either a gain realized or a
profit derived from capital, labor, or both, 5 since this is the
traditional United States definition of income."
In Rev. Rul. 78-61, the I.R.S. established three requirements that a foreign tax must meet to qualify as a creditable
income tax on a proper tax base: 7
13. See Seatrain Lines, Inc. v. Commissioner, 46 B.T.A. 1076 (1942) (Cuban tax
levied upon gross income was credited); Santa Eulalia Mining Co. v. Commissioner, 2
T.C. 241 (1943), appeal dismissed, 142 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1944) (Mexican tax upon
gross royalties received was credited because the significant expenses incurred in producing the income were already deducted by the party paying the royalty).
14. See S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942), 1942-2 C.B. 602. This report concerned the initial enactment of § 903, the "in lieu of" credit, which was
considered necessary by the committee because of the narrow reading given § 901 by
the courts and the I.R.S.
In the interpretation of the term "income tax," the Commissioner, the
Board [B.T.A.], and the courts have consistently adhered to a concept
of income tax rather closely related to our own, and if such foreign tax
was not imposed upon a basis corresponding approximately to net income
it was not recognized as a basis for such credit. . . .Your committee has
deemed it desirable to extend the scope of this section.
The fact that the extension of the credit provision took the form of the "in lieu of'
provision rather than an actual enlargement of § 901, gives implicit approval to the
narrow construction of this section. See Motland v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 358
(N.D. Iowa 1961).
15. E.g., Bank of America Trust & Say. Ass'n v. United States, 459 F.2d 513 (Ct.
Cl. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 949 (1972).
16. Accord, Keasbey & Mattison Co. v. Rothensies, 133 F.2d 894, 897 (3rd Cir.
1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 739 (1943); Abbot Laboratories Int'l Co. v. United States,
160 F. Supp. 321, 331 (N.D. 111.1958), aff'd per curiam, 267 F.2d 940 (7th Cir. 1959);
Allstate Ins. Co. v. United States, 419 F.2d 409, 414 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Lanman & KempBarclay & Co. of Columbia v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 582, 587 (1956); Rev. Rul. 69653, 1969-2 C.B. 152.
17. The I.R.S. held that it would determine whether the requirements were met
by referring to the entire class of taxpayers subject to the foreign tax, rather than on
a taxpayer-by-taxpayer or transaction-by-transaction basis. However, in Schering
Corp. & Subsidiaries v. Commissioner, /1978f Fed. Taxes (P-H) 69.46, at 57,471 (a
decision issued contemporaneously with this Revenue Ruling), the I.R.S. attempted
to persuade the Tax Court to make a determination of the noncreditability of a Swiss
withholding tax by referring solely to the taxpayer, Schering Corp., while at the same
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(1) The foreign tax must be levied on gain actually realized, since our own income tax is limited to realized as opposed
to constructive gain. The I.R.S. requires a "substantially
equivalent degree of realization with respect to foreign taxes."''
(2) The tax will be creditable only if "its purpose is to
reach net gain and it is so structured so as to be almost certain
of doing so." It is properly structured if, in the computation of
the tax base, it is very unlikely that taxpayers will have to pay
the tax if they have no net gain. 9
(3) A credit is denied if the tax is not levied on the receipt
of income but rather on "transactions such as sales or the exercise of a privilege or franchise." A tax that is imposed upon a
transaction or a privilege is denied credit even if measured by
net income. 0
time conceding that the tax in question was creditable when the entire class of taxpayers subject to the tax was considered. The court rejected this argument and granted
the credit. This inconsistency on the part of the I.R.S. may be explained, at least in
part, by the particular facts in the Schering case.
18. No authority directly supports this "three-pronged" test, but the I.R.S. does
seem to be generally true to the judicial interpretation of § 901 in each of the criteria.
The first prong (the tax must be levied upon gain actually realized) is clearly a proper
application of § 901; see Motland v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 358 (N.D. Iowa 1961)
(credit denied for a Cuban tax levied upon all capital exported from Cuba regardless
of whether or not the capital represented actually realized gain); F.W. Woolworth Co.
v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1233 (1970), nonacq. on another issue, 1971-2 C.B. 4 (credit
denied for a British tax imposed upon the rental value of all property owned by the
taxpayer, because this tax was imposed even if no rental income was realized from the
property); Lanman & Kemp-Barclay & Co. of Colombia v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 582
(1956) (credit denied for a Colombian patrimony tax imposed upon the appreciation
of all property located in Colombia irrespective of actual realization by the taxpayer
through sale); accord, Abbot Laboratories Int'l Co. v. United States, 160 F. Supp. 321
(N.D. IIl. 1958), aff'd per curiam, 267 F.2d 940 (7th Cir. 1959).
19. This second criterion (the tax must be designed to reach net gain), while
generally true, seems somewhat restrictive considering Seatrain Lines, Inc. v. Commissioner, 46 B.T.A. 1076 (1942) (discussed infra). The I.R.S. seems to be attempting to
restrict the credit to taxes that are structurally identical to our own in this test, an
idea that runs counter to the Seatrain doctrine.
20. This third "test" (a privilege or excise tax is not creditable) actually seems
to be little more than a conclusion to be drawn from the application of the first two
tests. The courts uniformly deny a credit to taxes classified as "privilege" taxes, but
the primary reasons for so classifying a tax are either because the tax is not imposed
upon gain actually realized, or because the tax is not designed or intended to reach
gain. Thus, while this "test" might be helpful in an overall consideration of a tax under
§ 901, it cannot truly stand independently. For decisions in this area, see Keasbey &
Mattison Co. v. Rothensies, 133 F.2d 894 (3rd Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 739
(1943) (discussed infra) (provincial Canadian tax imposed upon the value of extracted
ore was classified as a privilege tax because the value of the extraction taxed included
ore used by the operator, and thus represented gain never actually realized); American

480

JOURNAL

OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

AND POLICY

VOL. 8:475

When the above criteria are applied to the Ontario Mining
severance tax, two principal issues emerge concerning the creditability of taxes that are imposed on only one facet of an operation:
(1) Must a taxpayer be granted all of the "normal" deductions before a tax will be considered an income tax?
(2) Can a tax be limited to income earned from a particular operation, e.g., mining, and still qualify as an income tax?
]II. ANALYSIS
A. Must a taxpayer be grantedall of the "normal" deductions
before a tax will be considered an income tax for purposes of
section 901?
In the Ontario ruling, the mining severance tax was classified as a noncreditable privilege tax largely because the act
disallowed the deduction of "significant operating expenses"
that are deductible in the United States. The issue narrows to
this: When are deductions that are not allowed by the foreign
statute so significant as to deprive the tax of its characterization as an income tax?
The courts uniformly deny credit for any tax imposed upon
gross receipts. 2' The area that is less clear is the amount between gross receipts and net income (as defined by United
States law); this troublesome amount is gross income.Y
While there are indications that some courts will categorically deny credit for a tax based on gross income,2 the weight
of authority is to the contrary. The leading case, Seatrain
Metal Co. v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 879 (1953), aff'd, 221 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1955)
(Mexican tax on mining output was classified as a privilege tax because it was levied
upon the total value of output without any deductions, and was thus not aimed at gain
or profit actually realized); Mallouck v. Commissioner, 34 B.T.A. 269 (1936) (Phillipine tax upon the value of exported goods was a noncreditable privilege tax both
because it has no relation to gain realized through sale of the goods, and because
nonpayment meant forfeiture of the privilege of doing business in the Phillipines).
21. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 44 F. Supp. 863 (D. Minn.
1942); Allstate Ins. Co. v. United States, 419 F.2d 409 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Continental Ins.
Co. v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 540 (1939); I.T. 3429, 1940-2 C.B. 136.
22. Gross income may be defined as gross sales less the direct cost of making the
sales. It is thus distinct from gross receipts which consist of all income including that
which represents direct costs, while gross income excludes only the indirect costs of
generating income (such as fixed and administrative expense). 1 MERTEN, LAw OF
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATON

§ 5.10.

23. E.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 44 F. Supp. 863 (D. Minn,
1942).
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Lines, Inc. v. Commissioner,4 indicates that under the proper
circumstances a credit for a gross income tax will be allowed.
Seatrain involved a Cuban tax on the gross income of shipping
businesses. The tax was a flat 3% duty on gross income and was
considered an income tax by Cuba. Furthermore, this 3% duty
had replaced a 6% tax that had clearly been imposed on net
income. The change in rates occurred because of administrative difficulties in determining the amount of expense that had
actually been experienced by the taxpayers. Cuba cut the rate
by 3% as an estimated allowance for the average amount of
gross income consumed by operating expense. The tax was
still intended to reach net income even though it was imposed
on gross income, and the credit was allowed. In this case, the
critical fact was the intent of the Cuban Government in levying the tax to reach net income. Bank of America Trust & Sav.
Ass'n v. United States 5 clarified this perspective. There, the
tax was imposed on the gross income of branch banks in Thailand, the Philippines, and Argentina, but the statutes did not
allow for the deduction of significant operating expenses, such
as indirect bank expenses, rental, or bad debt expense, so the
court denied the credit. The court in Bank of America held that
a direct income tax is creditable even though imposed on gross
income, if it is highly likely, or was reasonably intended, always to reach some net gain in the normal circumstances in
which it applies. The tax failed this test because the court
could not say that the tax would reach, in all probability, net
2
gain. 0
These cases" make clear that a tax may be creditable even
if it does not allow for the deduction of all the "normal" expenses that are allowed under the Internal Revenue Code. The
24. 46 B.T.A. 1076 (1942).
25. 459 F.2d 513 (Ct. Cl. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 949 (1972).
26. Accord, Bank of America Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 752
(1974).
27. See also Santa Eulalia Mining Co. v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 241 (1943), appeal
dismissed, 142 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1944), where a credit was allowed for a Mexican tax
imposed upon the gross revenue derived from mining operations in Mexico. The tax
in question was withheld from a royalty payment. The court was willing to grant the
credit because the subcontractor, in determining the royalty, had already deducted the
significant direct operating expenses incurred in mining, and the court was certain that
the expenses connected with receiving the royalty were highly unlikely to exceed the
amount of the royalty. Thus, the tax in effect was certain to fall on net gain in the
United States sense.
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courts look beyond the label of a tax to its nature and purpose
in making a determination on its creditability. If the court
finds that the purpose and effect of a tax are to reach net
income, it will allow a credit despite the fact that the foreign
statute does not allow for the deduction of every expense that
is normally deductible in this country.
B. Can a tax be limited to a particularoperation, e.g.,
mining, and still qualify as an income tax?
In the abstract, nothing prevents a tax on a particular
operation, in this case mining, from qualifying for a credit as
long as it meets the judicial criteria of an income tax. 8 This
conclusion is especially true in cases involving severance taxes
on mining output where the activity taxed, the extraction of
minerals, results in marketable ore, a thing of value to the
operator which was not usable before the mining operation took
place. Extracting the ore is somewhat removed from the receipt
of income from the sale of that output, but as long as a tax on
the extraction is designed to, and does, reach the gain attributable to the mining function resulting in the sale of the ore, the
tax on the single operation of mining should be creditable.
Keasbey & Mattison Co. v. Rothensies," one of the leading
decisions on the creditability of severable mining taxes, concerned a 4% mining duty imposed by the province of Quebec
on all "profits" derived from mining ore in Quebec. The tax
was levied on the market value of all output that left the pit's
mouth, including both ore sold and ore used by the operator,
and thus never resulted in actual profit. The profit was determined by deducting any expense directly related to the mining
operation, including the direct salary and material expenses, as
well as indirect costs, such as insurance, depreciation and utilities costs, from the aggregate market value of the output. The
court disallowed the credit because this tax was not intended
or structured to reach any gain from the mining operation, but
28. See, e.g., Havana Electric Railway, Light & Power Co. v. Commissioner, 34
B.T.A. 782 (1936). The Board allowed a credit for a tax imposed by the muncipality
of Havana upon the income earned by the utility within the city, even though the
company's operations included other functions outside of Havana, and even though the
company was also subject to a national income tax. This seems to justify the proposition that as long as the tax in question is an income tax, it makes no difference how
the statute limits its operation, either geographically or functionally.
29. 133 F.2d (3rd Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 739 (1943).
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was rather intended as a tax on the privilege of removing the
minerals from the earth.30
American Metal Co. v. Commissioner" also involved a tax
imposed on the mining operation. The tax was imposed by
Mexico on the market value of all output whether the ore was
sold or utilized by the operator. Further, the tax allowed no
deductions from this total. Under these circumstances (including the fact that the taxpayer had suffered an actual loss for
several years but was still subject to the tax in those years), the
court denied a credit because this tax was independent of any
realized gain that might result from the sale of the minerals.
These cases clarify the creditability of taxes imposed on a
particular operation. To be creditable, the tax on the mining
operation must conform closely to an income tax as the concept
is understood in this country, and cannot be based on the constructive receipt of income fixed at an artificial level such as
the market value of the product, apart from the sale of the ore.2
This concept is developed further by New York & Honduras Rosario Mining Co. v. Commissioner," where a tax on mining operations in Honduras was allowed a section 901 credit.
The tax was imposed on "liquid profits" derived from the sale
of iron ore extracted from mines in Honduras. The act allowed
the deduction of every meaningful expense related to the mining operation, including indirect administrative costs; thus,
the tax was intended to reach the gain resulting from the sale
30. Placing a tax on the privilege of removing natural resources from the earth is
common, especially in the area of mining. This can only serve to increase the difficulty
of classifying an output tax as an income tax within § 901, since the natural place to
impose a mining privilege tax is at the point of the privileged activity, i.e., the extraction of the ore.
31. 19 T.C. 879 (1953), aff'd, 221 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1955).
32. See also Rev. Rul. 69-653,1969-2 C.B. 152, where the I.R.S. reviewed a mining
tax imposed by Quebec that was much like the tax disallowed in Keasbey. The I.R.S.
denied a credit for this tax because the tax was not properly laid upon income (gain
derived from labor, capital, or from both combined) but rather included in the tax base
nonincome items, such as the market value of ore shipped or consumed by the operator. Nor did it matter that all expenses directly related to the mining function were
deductible, since an income tax cannot be levied on items that do not represent gain.
It is obvious that any attempt to distinguish Keasbey and Rev. Rul. 69-653 from the
Ontario tax will fail, since they involved the same features that identify the noncreditable nature of the Quebec mining taxes (they also were levied upon nonincome items
such as the value of ore consumed by the operator, and allowed for the deduction of
even fewer expenses than were allowed in Keasbey).
33. 168 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1948); see also Rev. Rul. 57-62, 1957-1 C.B. 241.
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of the ore. Furthermore, the court recognized that the Honduran tax was distinguishable from the one disallowed in Keasbey
in that the tax in Keasbey was levied on the gross value of
output less direct mining expenses, while the Honduran tax
included as its base only income actually received through
sales, less the total expense needed to generate the sales.34
New York & Honduras Rosario Co. indicates that a tax
upon the separate mining operation will be creditable only if
the tax is imposed on gain actually realized through sale of the
output and only if the foreign statute allows for the deduction
of every significant expense incurred in producing the mining
income. This highlights the importance of the concept of realized gain in section 901. The courts uniformly require that a tax
be levied on a base that represents a gain that the taxpayer has
received in the form of income. 5 When this principle is applied
to the severable mining taxes reviewed here, it becomes clear
that section 901 will only extend to taxes imposed on the mining function if the tax is designed to reach only realized gain
that is attributable to the mining function, and when the statute is restricted in its base to ore that is intended for sale and
not for the operator's use.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In Rev. Rul. 78-61, the Internal Revenue Service adopted
a restrictive view of section 901 of the Internal Revenue Code.
When this ruling is applied to the Ontario Mining tax, the
I.R.S. position seems justified, since this tax is nothing more
34. See also Santa Eulalia Mining Co. v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 241 (1943), appeal
dismissed, 142 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1944), where a tax withheld from a royalty payment
was allowed as a § 901 credit. The tax withheld was levied upon the gross income
derived from the mining operation of the company paying the royalty, and the court
allowed the credit because the significant expenses incurred in mining the ore had
already been deducted from the income base on which the royalty was paid.
35. See Lanman & Kemp-Barclay & Co. of Columbia v. Commissioner, 26 T.C.
582 (1956), where the tax in question was a patrimony tax imposed on the value of a
taxpayer's assets, regardless of whether or not the taxpayer actually realized any gain
from the use or sale of the assets. The tax, in effect, was levied on appreciation of all
property in Colombia even if the appreciation had not been realized through sale. The
credit was denied under these circumstances, because
[tihe doctrine that only those increases in value of property which are
actually realized by the owner constitute taxable income is basic to the
income tax system of the United States . . . (citations ommitted). "The
defined concept of income has been uniformly restricted to a gain realized
or a profit derived from capital, labor, or both." (Citing Keasby.)
26 T.C. 582, at 587. See also Motland v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 358 (N.D. Iowa
1961).
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than a tax on the privilege of extracting ore from the mines of
Ontario. However, the three strict criteria set forth by the
I.R.S. in Rev. Rul. 78-61 may exceed the standards set forth in
some of the decisions reviewed here. For instance, the I.R.S.
would seem to deny creditability to any tax that fails to provide
for the major "normal" expenses that are allowed under the
Internal Revenue Code,"8 while Seatrain,Bank of America, and
Santa Eulalia all indicate that the courts are willing to grant
a credit to such taxes if they are net income taxes in purpose
and effect. Also, the I.R.S. would certainly classify any tax
imposed on a separate operation as a privilege'or excise tax,
while New York & Honduras Rosario Co. and Santa Eulalia
indicate that such a tax should be credited despite its functional limitation if it fulfills the traditional criteria of an income tax.
Looking to the future development of the foreign tax credit
after Rev. Rul. 78-61, the restrictive view of the I.R.S. will
certainly be the cause of litigation by taxpayers seeking a more
generous interpretation of section 901. It is also probable that
as the tax considerations of foreign investment decisions increase in importance, lobbying pressure by U.S. nationals in
foreign legislatures may cause some countries to restructure
their tax laws to conform with this country's Internal Revenue
Code. This result will stimulate investment in such countries
by allowing U.S. nationals to take full advantage of section 901
in their tax considerations. Thus, in the long run, Rev. Rul. 7861 may well be an important force in lessening the strife over
the proper interpretation of section 901, as it will be a strong
impetus toward structural conformity in revenue laws.
36. E.g., in Rev. Rul. 78-61, I.R. Bull. No. 1978-8 11 at 14, the I.R.S. holds that
expenses incurred in producing gross income are not inherently so slight as to insure
that they will never exceed the gross income, and for this reason, a tax on gross income
should not be creditable.

